Where to Place the Burden: Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Administrative Due Process Hearings by White, William D.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 84 | Number 3 Article 6
3-1-2006
Where to Place the Burden: Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act Administrative Due
Process Hearings
William D. White
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William D. White, Where to Place the Burden: Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Administrative Due Process Hearings, 84 N.C. L.
Rev. 1013 (2006).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol84/iss3/6
Where To Place the Burden: Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act Administrative Due Process Hearings
INTRO D UCTION ..................................................................................... 1013
I. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT:
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION ............................................ 1015
II. THE INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM: THE DUE
PROCESS PROCEDURE .............................................................. 1021
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND ITS RESOLUTION: IDEA
ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN OF PROOF ................................... 1026
A. Courts that Assigned the Burden to the School System... 1026
B. Courts that Assigned the Burden to the Challenging
P arty ..................................................................................... 1031
C. The Supreme Court Resolves the Circuit Split ................. 1033
IV. THE APPROPRIATE POSITIONING OF THE BURDEN OF
P R O O F ......................................................................................... 1034
A. IDEA Precursors, IDEA Reauthorization, and Burden
of P roof ............................................................................... 1035
B. IDEA and the Comparison to Other Remedial Statutes. 1037
C. The IDEA's Procedural Safeguards and the Burden of
P roof .................................................................................... 1039
D. The Impact of the 2004 IDEA Reauthorization on the
Burden of Proof .................................................................. 1043
V. THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND AN INITIAL IEP ...................... 1045
C O N CLU SIO N ......................................................................................... 1047
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, some of the biggest education policy debates in
Washington have been over special education.1 Students between the
ages of six and seventeen with disabilities comprised 11.5% of student
enrollment between prekindergarten and twelfth grade in 2000-2001.'
The number of students covered by federal special education law rose
28.4% from 1991-92 to 2000-2001. 3 Such students have a wide
variety of disabilities ranging from speech or language impairment to
1. See John O'Neil, Q&A: A Better IDEA, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002, § 4A
(Education Life), at 17.
2. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 11-19
(2002), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/20O2/index.html.
3. Id.
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autism to emotional disturbance.4 Congress apportioned close to $9
billion in 2003 to the states for help in educating these children, which
represented only about eighteen percent of all average per pupil
expenditures.' Clearly, Americans today have a stake in special
education either directly as parents of one of the one in ten children
in school with a disability or as taxpayers picking up the tab for
federal special education mandates.
In 1975, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act ("EAHCA").6 This legislation was the forerunner to
the modern Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 7
which seeks to "ensure that all children with disabilities have
available to them a free appropriate public education."8 A central
feature of the statute is the Individualized Education Program
("IEP"), which requires development of an IEP for every disabled
child in every public school system receiving federal funds.9 In what
some call the most controversial feature of the statute, l° Congress
provided parents a means to challenge local school systems' decisions
concerning the method of their disabled child's education through an
administrative due process hearing with the possibility of judicial
review." However, the statute is silent on the burden of proof at the
administrative level. 2 Nine circuits split over whether the burden
should be placed on the school system or whichever party is
challenging the IEP, usually the parents. 3 The Supreme Court
4. Id.
5. H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 149-50 (2003).
6. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1487 (West Supp. 2005)).
7. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1487 (West. Supp. 2005). For a more detailed discussion of
the history and interpretation of this statute, see infra Part I.
8. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
9. Id. § 1412(a)(3)-(4). For more detailed information about the development and
implementation of IEPs, see infra Part II.
10. See Steven S. Goldberg & Peter J. Kuriloff, Doing Away with Due Process:
Seeking Alternative Dispute Resolution in Special Education, 42 W. EDUC. L. REP. 491, 491
(1988).
11. § 1415. The regulations promulgated by the Department of Education with
respect to this statute are codified in 34 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2004).
12. This Comment discusses the burden of proof in the context of the burden of
persuasion, as defined by which party will lose if the evidence is equally balanced. See
Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 533-34 (2005).
13. For a more detailed examination of the circuit split, see infra Part III. Seven
circuits generally placed the burden on the school system. See L.T. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick
Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 82 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004); Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493,496 (7th
Cir. 2002); Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998); E.S. v.
Inaep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998); Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P.,
62 F.3d 520, 524 (3d Cir. 1995); Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398
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recently resolved this issue in Schaffer v. Weast, a holding that the
burden of persuasion lies "on the party seeking relief."' 5
As illustrated by the sharp divide among circuits, conflicting
arguments emerged for placing the IEP due process hearing burden
of proof on the challenging party as well as for placing it on the school
system. Part I of this Comment discusses the legislative and judicial
history of the IDEA. Part II goes into more detail concerning the
IDEA's due process procedure. Part III examines the circuit split and
analyzes the various appellate court interpretations as well as the
recent Supreme Court decision. Part IV demonstrates that when the
disabled child's parents previously ratified a now-established
operative IEP, the burden should be on the party bringing the
challenge. In contrast, Part V of this Comment recommends placing
the burden of proof on the school system in the case of an initial IEP
challenge, where the parents and the school system fail to come to an
agreement on an IEP formulation.
I. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT:
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION
Before the adoption of the EAHCA, two district court decisions
paved the way for a federal due process requirement for educating
children with disabilities in public schools. 6 In the first of these cases,
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania
("PARC"),17 parents, on behalf of each of the thirteen disabled
children, and the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children
brought a class action lawsuit against Pennsylvania educational
authorities, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of several
state statutes that operated to exclude disabled children from the
public school system. 8 The plaintiffs argued that the statutes were
(9th Cir. 1994); McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Four circuits
generally placed the burden on the challenging party. See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449,
456 (4th Cir. 2004), affd, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005); Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d
1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1990); Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1466 (6th Cir. 1990);
Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1158 (5th Cir. 1986).
14. 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
15. Id. at 531.
16. For a general overview of these two cases, see generally Lauren Zykorie,
Reauthorizing Discipline for the Disabled Student: Will Congress Create a Better Balance
in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)?, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 101,
107-10 (2003); Kelly S. Thompson, Note, Limits on the Ability to Discipline Disabled
School Children: Do the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA Go Far Enough?, 32 IND. L. REV.
565, 567-68 (1999).
17. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
18. Id. at 281-82.
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unconstitutional on several grounds, including lack of appropriate
due process and denial of equal protection for the disabled. 9 The
court never decided the constitutional issues, as the parties settled
with a consent decree; however, the decree stated that all disabled
children had the right to a free public education appropriate to their
capacity for learning,2° and no disabled child could be either initially
assigned or reassigned to regular or special education status without a
due process hearing.21
The second case, Mills v. Board of Education,2 also involved
disabled children excluded from public education without due
process.23  The court held for the plaintiffs (seven children
represented by their next friends), stating that, "the defendants' [the
District of Columbia Board of Education and other educational
officials] conduct here, denying plaintiffs and their class not just an
equal publicly supported education but all publicly supported
education while providing such education to other children, is
violative of the Due Process Clause. ' 24 The court emphasized the
importance of education in its opinion, quoting Chief Justice
Warren's language from Brown v. Board of Education .2  The final
judgment of the court included requiring procedures similar to those
that Congress later mandated in the EAHCA and IDEA.26  The
District of Columbia Board of Education suggested these procedures
to the court as a means of implementing a judgment ordering an
appropriate education for disabled children. The procedures
included such measures as notification of parents before special
educational placement; independent, free disability evaluation; and a
hearing before the board with the ability to present witnesses.27
19. See id. at 283.
20. See id. at 287.
21. See id. at 284-85.
22. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
23. Id. at 868.
24. Id. at 875.
25. Id. at 874 ("Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments." (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954))).
26. See Thompson, supra note 16, at 567 ("In the end, the court required that the
school system follow many of the same guidelines and procedures later adopted by
Congress in the IDEA.").
27. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 877-83.
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Congress passed the EAHCA in 197528 in response to problems
facing disabled children in public schools as noted in PARC and
Mills.29  The stated purpose of the bill was "to assure that all
handicapped children have available to them ... a free appropriate
public education."30 The central feature of the bill with regard to
educating disabled children was the requirement that state
educational departments implement individualized education
programs for handicapped children.3  The bill defined an
"individualized education program" as:
[A] written statement for each handicapped child developed in
any meeting by a representative of the local educational agency
or an intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to
provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed
instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children,
the teacher, the parents or guardian of such child, and,
whenever appropriate, such child, which statement shall include
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational
performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals,
including short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of
the specific educational services to be provided to such child,
and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in
regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for
initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and (E)
appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and
28. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1487 (West Supp. 2005)). For a broad
overview of the provisions of Public Law 94-142, see generally JAMES A. SHRYBMAN,
DUE PROCESS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 9-28 (George Matsoukas ed., 1982).
29. See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 6 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1430
(citing the Mills and PARC cases); see also STEPHEN C. LARSEN & MARY S. POPLIN,
METHODS FOR EDUCATING THE HANDICAPPED: AN INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION
PROGRAM APPROACH 6 (1980) ("In essence, PL 94-142 stipulates that school systems and
other public agencies are no longer able to exclude handicapped children simply on the
basis that they exhibit problems too severe to be handled in the school setting, do not have
appropriate programs, or are judged to be uneducable."). The Supreme Court has noted
the importance of the PARC and Mills cases in the enactment of the EAHCA. See Bd. of
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 n.2 (1982).
30. § 3(c), 89 Stat. at 775 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (West
Supp. 2005)).
31. See LARSEN & POPLIN, supra note 29, at 8 ("Developing the IEP is the central
feature in effective and efficient education of the handicapped.").
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schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether
instructional objectives are being achieved.32
The current IDEA statute contains an expanded definition of the
IEP, including more detailed requirements,33 but the IEP nonetheless
retains its basic meaning from the EAHCA bill. The EAHCA also
mandated the due process hearing administrative procedure that is
the subject of this Comment.3"
Before discussing the modern implementation of the EAHCA,
known as the IDEA, an understanding of the Supreme Court's
decision in Board of Education v. Rowley35 will properly frame the
issues. In Rowley, the parents of a hearing-impaired child claimed
that the "free appropriate public education" mandated by the
EAHCA required the child's school to provide a sign-language
interpreter in the classroom. 36  The Supreme Court held that the
EAHCA did not require such an interpreter.37
In deciding Rowley, the Court first provided an interpretation of
a "free appropriate public education. '38  In light of the statute's
definition and statements of purpose, the Court decided that "the
face of the statute evinces a congressional intent to bring previously
excluded handicapped children into the public education systems of
the States and to require the States to adopt procedures which would
result in individualized consideration of and instruction for each
child."39 The Court went on to note the statute's lack of any required
substantive standards of education' and ultimately construed the
statute as primarily designed to provide the availability of education
for disabled children, as opposed to guaranteeing a substantive level
of quality of education.41 In adopting this definition, the Court
32. § 4(a)(4), 89 Stat. at 776 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(1)(A)
(West Supp. 2005)). The modern IDEA definition, found in 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d),
retains these basic elements.
33. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d).
34. § 612(5)(A), 89 Stat. at 781 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(6)(A)
(West Supp. 2005)).
35. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). For a more detailed overview of the Rowley decision, see
generally Steven N. Robinson, Rowley: The Court's First Interpretation of the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 941 (1983).
36. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184.
37. Id. at 210.
38. See id. at 203-04.
39. Id. at 189.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 192; see also id. at 203 ("Insofar as a State is required to provide a
handicapped child with a 'free appropriate public education,' we hold that it satisfies this
1018 [Vol. 84
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expressly rejected the argument that the statute requires maximizing
the educational potential of each disabled child to be equal with the
opportunities provided to non-disabled children.42
The second major portion of the Court's opinion in Rowley
discusses the role of the courts in exercising judicial review over
administrative due process hearings under the statute.43 The Court
decided reviewing courts should follow a two-part test." The first
part is whether the state has complied with the statute's procedural
requirements. 45  The second part is whether the IEP is "reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. 46 The
Court emphasized that the primary role of the states is selecting
educational methodology and cautioned against lower courts
attempting to impose their own views of preferable educational
methods. 47 Applying this test, the Court held that since the child in
question was performing "better than the average child in her class"
with personalized instruction and there was no finding that the state
violated the statute's procedural protections, the statute did not
require a sign-language interpreter to be placed in the classroom.
48
As a whole, the Rowley opinion stressed the importance of the
requirement by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to
permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.").
42. Id. at 200. Subsequent to Rowley, lower courts attempted to expand the decision's
minimal definition of an appropriate education. See ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR. &
CHARLES J. RuSSO, SPECIAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR
PRACTITIONERS 22-23 (2003). For example, in 1985 the Fourth Circuit held that "trivial"
educational benefits for disabled children would not be enough to fulfill the requirement
of an "educational benefit." See Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 635-36
(4th Cir. 1985); see also Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171,184
(3d Cir. 1988) ("[W]e hold that Congress intended to afford children with special needs an
education that would confer meaningful benefit.").
43. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204-09. For a discussion of the mechanics of the IDEA
due process hearing, see infra notes 86-110 and accompanying text.
44. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 206-07.
47. Id. (using the phrase "due weight" to describe the proper standard of deference
for a reviewing court to use to examine the administrative proceeding). There is a debate
over the precise meaning of the words "due weight," specifically whether they indicate
deference to the administrative proceeding itself or to the local educational officials. This
debate is outside the scope of this Comment, which is concerned with the administrative
proceeding itself, as opposed to judicial review. For one analysis of this issue, see Thomas
F. Guernsey, When the Teachers and Parents Can't Agree, Who Really Decides? Burdens
of Proof and Standards of Review Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act,
36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67, 77-89 (1988).
48. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209-10.
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statute's procedural safeguards.49 As one commentator stated in
discussing Rowley, "[i]n effect, IDEA is to be viewed as a law of
process, and not one of outcome."5 Rowley continues to prominently
influence IDEA interpretation.5
In 1990, Congress reauthorized the EAHCA and renamed it the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.52 In addition to the
renaming, a major substantive change required that "transition
services" be included in IEPs for children over sixteen.53 Transition
services were defined by the statute as activities that will aid the
disabled individual in moving from the school system to independent
life.54
Congress reauthorized and modified the IDEA further in 1997.11
The amendment represented a significant change to the statute,56
including the concept that disabled children should be educated with
49. See id. at 205 ("When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards
embodied in [the EAHCA's due process section] are contrasted with the general and
somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions contained in the Act, we think that the
importance Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid."); see
also JAMES N. HOLLIS, CONDUCTING INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM
MEETINGS THAT WITHSTAND DUE PROCESS: THE INFORMAL EVIDENTIARY
PROCEEDING 3 (1998) ("The Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Rowley reminds us
that IDEA's procedures are seen as the key to its substantive success.").
50. Martin W. Bates, Free Appropriate Public Education Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: Requirements, Issues and Suggestions, 1994 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
215,217.
51. Id. at 220 ("Rowley remains the only extensive Supreme Court treatment of
IDEA."); see also Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: New Focus in Special
Education Law, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 561, 561 ("Rowley is undoubtedly the most
important and influential case in special education law.").
52. Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, sec.
901 (a)(1), § 601(a), 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-42 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(a)
(West Supp. 2005)).
53. See Zykorie, supra note 16, at 114 n.81.
54. Sec. 101(a), § 602(a)(19), 104 Stat. at 1103-04 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1401(34) (West Supp. 2005)) ("The term 'transition services' means a coordinated set of
activities for a student, designed within an outcome-oriented process, which promotes
movement from school to post-school activities, including post-secondary education,
vocational training, integrated employment (including supported employment), continuing
and adult education, adult services, independent living, or community participation.").
55. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1482 (West Supp. 2005)).
56. See Zykorie, supra note 16, at 115-16 ("The 1997 IDEA also emphasized testing,
inclusion, results, funding, assessment, accountability, clearer standards and definitions
within the law, parent training, technology development, and paperwork reduction."
(citation omitted)). For a more detailed discussion of the modifications Congress made in
1997, see generally EDWARD BURNS, DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING IDEA-IEPs:
AN INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM (IEP) HANDBOOK FOR MEETING
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA) REQUIREMENTS 22-27
(Charles C. Thomas ed., 2001).
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general education children whenever possible. 7 This amendment
also added the requirement for school systems to provide a state-
funded mediation option when there is a request for a due process
hearing. 8
Recently, Congress once again reauthorized and amended the
IDEA in December of 2004.19 The new amendments became
completely effective on July 1, 2005.' Primarily, these amendments
aim to make the statute less litigious.6' Although the amendments do
not address the burden of proof at the due process level, Congress
added features designed to make the complaint process more
settlement-oriented, such as a mandatory pre-hearing meeting
between parents and the school system.62 The potential consequences
of the new due process features on the appropriate place for the
burden of proof are discussed below.63
II. THE INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM: THE DUE
PROCESS PROCEDURE
As discussed above, a central feature of the IDEA legislation is
the IEP, as was the case upon the EAHCA's adoption in 1975.64 The
Department of Education calls the IEP the "cornerstone of special
57. See SABRINA HOLCOMB ET AL., THE NEW IDEA SURVIVAL GUIDE 10-11 (2000)
("The main principle of IDEA '97: Students with disabilities should be educated within
the general education classroom with appropriate aids and services, if necessary .... ); see
also H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 100 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 97 ("The
majority of children identified as eligible for special education and related services are
capable of participating in the general education curriculum to varying degrees with some
adaptations and modifications.").
58. Sec. 101, § 615(e), 111 Stat. at 90-91.
59. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1482 (West Supp. 2005)).
60. Id. § 302(a)(1), 118 Stat. at 2803.
61. See id. sec. 101, § 601(c)(8), 118 Stat. at 2650 (stating a congressional belief that
"[p]arents and schools should be given expanded opportunities to resolve their
disagreements in positive and constructive ways"); see also H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 85
(2003) ("Litigation under the Act has taken the less productive track of searching for
technical violations of the Act by school districts rather than being used to protect the
substantive rights of children with disabilities."); President George W. Bush, President's
Remarks at the Signing of H.R. 1350 (Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2004/12/20041203-6.html ("We're making the system less
litigious, so it can focus on the children and their parents.").
62. Sec. 101, § 615(f)(1)(B), 118 Stat. at 2720-21 (codified at 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1415(f)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2005)).
63. See infra Part IV.D.
64. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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education."'65 Parents and the school system collaborate as partners in
the process of designing the IEP document.66 The IDEA defines an
"IEP Team" as a group that includes the disabled child's parents,
teachers, and other personnel who may have expertise regarding the
child. 67 The Department of Education's IEP guide lists ten steps in
the overall IEP picture.' These steps, in chronological order, consist
of: identifying the disabled child; evaluating the child; determining
IDEA eligibility; finding IDEA eligibility; scheduling an IEP team
meeting; holding the IEP meeting and drafting the IEP; providing the
services required for the child by the IEP; measuring the child's
progress and reporting to the parents; periodically reviewing the IEP;
and reevaluating the child.69
Before the procedural safeguards concerning IEPs become
relevant, disabled children must be identified. The IDEA mandates
that states identify all children with disabilities who are in need of
special education.7" Either parents or educational agencies may
request an evaluation to determine a student's IDEA eligibility.71
The statute requires the use of "a variety of assessment tools and
strategies"72 to determine eligibility, administered by "trained and
knowledgeable personnel,"73 along with other substantive evaluation
requirements.74  Even after identification and initial IEP
development, IEPs must be reviewed at least annually and revised
when appropriate to address the child's progress and needs.75
The IDEA contains extensive procedural safeguards for
parents.76  The statute spells out these safeguards with great
65. OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHABILITATIVE SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., A
GUIDE TO THE INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM (Lisa KIpper edo, 2000),
available at http://www.ed.gov/parents/needs/speced/iepguide/index.html [hereinafter IEP
GUIDE].
66. See BURNS, supra note 56, at 9 ("Parents are ... equal partners with school
personnel in making IEP decisions.").
67. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2005).
68. IEP GUIDE, supra note 65.
69. Id.
70. § 1412(a)(3)(A).
71. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(B).
72. Id. § 1414(b)(2)(A).
73. Id. § 1414(b)(3)(A)(iv).
74. See id. § 1414(b).
75. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A).
76. Id. § 1415. For an overview of the IDEA's procedural safeguards in plain English,
see generally Dixie Snow Huefner, A Model for Explaining the Procedural Safeguards of
IDEA '97, 134 W. EDUC. L. REP. 445 (1998). Note that these safeguards have been
modified by the 2004 IDEA Reauthorization, but Huefner still provides a relevant
overview.
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specificity in contrast to the relatively vague definition of substantive
educational standards.77 The procedural safeguards include, but are
not limited to: the rights of parents to examine all records related to
the child;78 written notice to the parents whenever the school system
proposes to change or refuses to change the identification, evaluation,
or placement of the child;79 an opportunity for mediation;8' a due
process hearing and appeal;8 and the right to judicial review.82
The IDEA due process hearing has been called the most
controversial feature of the statute8 3 and has been the subject of
analysis and criticism. 4  Nevertheless, the 2004 IDEA legislation
retains the essence of the original due process hearing concepts but
adds features that aim to make the process less litigious." Before
addressing the primary concern of this Comment, the administrative
burden of proof, a brief overview of the IDEA due process hearing
procedure is warranted.
The due process procedure commences when a disabled child's
parent or guardian (or possibly the school system) becomes
dissatisfied with an IEP and files a complaint.86  The 2004
amendments add a new statute of limitations that provides parents
with two years to file a complaint from the time they knew or should
have known about the action underlying the complaint.87 The
complaint must contain the name and address of the child and the
school the child is attending, a description of the problem, and a
proposed resolution. 8 The party receiving the complaint has ten days
to address the issues raised in the complaint.89  Complaints may be
77. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
78. § 1415(b)(1).
79. Id. § 1415(b)(3).
80. Id. § 1415(b)(5).
81. Id. § 1415(f)-(g).
82. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
83. See Goldberg & Kuriloff, supra note 10, at 492 (noting that "[t]he due process
procedures grant parents an unprecedented right to challenge any aspect of a current or
proposed special education program").
84. See generally id. (asserting that the due process model may be the least desirable
special education dispute resolution device); Howard Margolis, Avoiding Special
Education Due Process Hearings: Lessons from the Field, 9 J. EDUC. & PSYCHOL.
CONSULTATION 233 (1998) (describing eight lessons for IEP teams to follow for the
purpose of avoiding due process hearings); Perry A. Zirkel, Over-Due Process Revisions
for the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 55 MONT. L. REV. 403 (1994) (stating
that due process hearings are time consuming, overly adversarial, expensive, and unfair).
85. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
86. § 1415(b)(6).
87. Id. § 1415(b)(6)(B).
88. Id. § 1415(b)(7)(A).
89. Id. § 1415(c)(2)(B).
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amended if the other party consents and is given opportunity to
resolve the complaint or if the hearing officer grants permission not
later than five days before the due process hearing.9" If the local
education agency does not satisfy the parents' concerns within thirty
days of receipt of the complaint, the due process hearing may occur.9'
The response time limitation, the complaint amendment, and the
thirty-day pre-hearing period appeared as new elements of the statute
with the 2004 amendments. 92
Also new with the 2004 amendments is the "resolution session,"
a meeting convened within fifteen days of receipt of the parents'
complaint.93 The meeting is a forum for the parents to discuss their
complaint with the local education agency, while providing the agency
with an opportunity to resolve the dispute.94 The meeting can be
avoided if both parties agree in writing or consent to use the statutory
mediation device instead of the due process hearing.95
The statute includes required qualifications for the person
conducting the due process hearing. The hearing officer cannot be an
employee of the state educational agency or the disabled child's local
educational agency, nor otherwise have a conflict of interest.96 The
hearing officer must understand the IDEA and the regulations
promulgated thereunder.97 The hearing officer must "possess the
knowledge and ability to conduct hearings in accordance with
appropriate, standard legal practice" 98 and must "possess the
knowledge and ability to render and write decisions in accordance
with appropriate, standard legal practice." 9
The parties must confine the subject matter of the hearing to the
issues in the complaint unless the other party gives consent to a
broader scope."°  The amount of discretion the hearing officer
possesses to find violations depends upon whether the alleged
violations are substantive or procedural. The statute gives broad
authority to a hearing officer to find substantive violations concerning
90. Id. § 1415(c)(2)(E).
91. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii).
92. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-446, sec. 101, § 615, 118 Stat. 2647, 2717-21 (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (West
Supp. 2005)).
93. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(I).
94. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
95. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i).
96. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i).
97. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(ii).
98. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(iii).
99. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(iv).
100. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(B).
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a denial of a free appropriate public education.101 For procedural
violations, however, the statute permits the hearing officer to find a
violation only if the alleged procedural defect denied the child a free
appropriate public education, significantly impeded the parents from
participating in the decisionmaking process, or caused a deprivation
of educational benefits. 0 2  The statute provides for an appeal by
either party to the state educational agency. 03
Congress provided a civil right of action in state or federal
district court for parties not content with the results of the
administrative process.' °4 Such action is available only after a party
exhausts all available administrative remedies available under the due
process section of the statute. 05 The court can look at both the
administrative record and any additional evidence at the request of
the parties.0 6 The judicial standard of decision is a preponderance of
the evidence, and the court has broad authority to "grant such relief
as the court determines is appropriate.'
'0 7
In an another'controversial section of the statute, the court may
award attorney's fees to prevailing parents for any action under the
due process section. 10 8 There are sections providing for the reduction
of these fees for equitable reasons, such as a finding that the parents
unreasonably protracted resolution or that the complaint did not
contain all appropriate information.0 9 In an attempt to further limit
frivolous actions, the 2004 amendments to the IDEA provide that a
prevailing school system may recover attorney's fees against the
parents' attorney if the parents filed a frivolous complaint or if the
complaint was filed for an improper purpose.1
101. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i).
102. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii).
103. Id. § 1415(g).
104. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
105. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
106. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(1). There is an argument that this section, added in 1986,
greatly contributes to the litigious nature and expense of special education due process
procedures. See Zirkel, supra note 84, at 405; see also OSBORNE & RUSSO, supra note 42,
at 168 ("One of the most often litigated issues under the [IDEA] pertains to the issue of
whether parents were actually the prevailing party in the litigation.").
109. § 1415(i)(3)(F).
110. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND ITS RESOLUTION: IDEA
ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN OF PROOF
Although Congress spelled out a detailed due process hearing
procedure for the IDEA,"' the statute does not speak to the
administrative burden of proof for due process hearings.112  The
IDEA's statutory silence concerning the burden of proof permitted
an extensive circuit split to develop around the issue. Courts of
appeals were sharply divided on the question, and some opinions
confused the situation further by not explicitly stating the level of
review they addressed.'13 The Supreme Court recently resolved this
circuit split by holding that the burden of proof at the administrative
due process hearing is on the party seeking relief."' Before analyzing
the merits of the various positions, it will be helpful to briefly survey
the different approaches previously taken by courts around the
country.
115
A. Courts that Assigned the Burden to the School System
The D.C. Circuit's decision in McKenzie v. Smith'16 provided the
starting point for the burden of proof debate. McKenzie involved
parents objecting to the District of Columbia public school system's
proposed placement of their disabled child."7 It must be noted that
McKenzie does not directly touch the issue of burden of proof at the
administrative level, but it does contain language that forms the basis
of one of the major arguments for placing the burden on the school
system. The court, in holding that the notice of the proposed
placement given to the parents was procedurally deficient, stated that
"[t]he underlying assumption of the Act is that to the extent its
procedural mechanisms are faithfully employed, handicapped
111. See supra Part II; see also OSBORNE & RUSSO, supra note 42, at 167 ("The IDEA
contains one of the most comprehensive mechanisms for dispute resolution ever created
by Congress.").
112. The statute is also silent on the burden of proof at the judicial review level.
However, this Comment addresses only the burden at the administrative level unless
otherwise noted.
113. See Weast v. Schaffer, 240 F. Supp. 2d 396, 403 n.7 (D. Md. 2002) ("It is not always
clear from the language of these [IDEA burden of proof] cases whether they are
addressing the burden of proof at the administrative level, in the district court, or both."),
rev'd, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004), affd, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
114. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 531 (2005).
115. For more discussion concerning the circuit split, see generally Ronald D. Wenkart,
The Burden of Proof in IDEA Due Process Hearings, 187 W. EDUC. L. REP. 817 (2004).
116. 771 F.2d 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
117. Id. at 1530. The hearing officer held for the parents, and the district court
affirmed. Id. at 1530-31.
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children will be afforded an appropriate education." '118 In so holding,
the court drew on the Supreme Court's IDEA interpretation from
Rowley, which emphasized the importance of the IDEA's procedural
mechanisms. The D.C. Circuit took this interpretation to mean that
the statute requires the school system to establish that it met the
elaborate safeguards in the IDEA.n 9 This was not a case alleging a
substantive deficiency in a child's IEP, but the case was, nonetheless,
significant because the opinion drew an early connection between the
IDEA's extensive procedural safeguards and the allocation to the
state of the burden of proof in IDEA due process hearings.
Ten years later, the Third Circuit similarly allocated the burden
of proof to the school district in Carlisle Area School v. Scott P.'
The Carlisle court held that school systems have the burden to prove
the appropriateness of any IEPs that they propose.' The court did,
however, state that school systems do not have the burden of proving
the inappropriateness of any plan the parents propose. 2
In reaching its decision in Carlisle, the Third Circuit cited a
previous IDEA decision, Oberti v. Board of Education.23 Oberti held
that the burden of proof at the judicial level is on the school system. l 4
These two decisions based their burden of proof arguments in part on
the IDEA's "least restrictive environment" or "mainstreaming"
presumption.2 5 The IDEA requires states to place disabled children
in the "least restrictive environment"' 26-characterized as "an
environment that, given the child's individual educational needs,
provides the fewest restrictions not encountered by the non-disabled
student."'2 7 In these two cases, the court concluded that the IDEA's
presumption of "mainstreaming," or placing children in regular
classrooms whenever possible, requires the party proposing the more
restrictive placement to prove the appropriateness of that
placement. 2 8 The Third Circuit used this presumption in Oberti in
deciding where to place the burden, since the school system in Oberti
118. Id. at 1532.
119. Id. ("It was particularly important in this case that [the school system] faithfully
comply with the [IDEA]'s requirements.").
120. 62 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 1995).
121. Id. at 524.
122. Id.
123. 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
124. Id. at 1219-20.
125. See Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 533; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219-20.
126. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5) (West Supp. 2005).
127. THOMAS F. GUERNSEY & KATHE KLARE, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 117 (2d
ed. 2001).
128. See Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 533; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219-20.
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advocated for a more restrictive environment. 29  Although the
parents requested a more restrictive environment in Carlisle, the
court still placed the burden of proof on the school system, qualifying
the holding only to say that the school system did not have to prove
the inappropriateness of the parents' proposal.130 In addition to the
mainstreaming presumption, Oberti also cited school systems'
advantages in access to information, witnesses, and expertise as
reasons partially justifying placing the burden with the school
system."' These are all potential justifications for also placing the
burden on the school system at the administrative level.
Finally, several other courts simply assume without analysis that
the burden of proof in the administrative proceeding is on the school
system. These include the First Circuit,132 the Second Circuit,133 the
Seventh Circuit, '3 the Eighth Circuit, 35 and the Ninth Circuit.'36 The
Ninth Circuit opinion in Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District No. 3
deserves special mention, because in addition to holding that the
school district has the burden of proof at the administrative level, it
held (contrary to Oberti) that the burden of proof at the judicial level
is on the party challenging the administrative decision, not necessarily
the school system. 137  The Ninth Circuit's analysis with regard to
judicial level foreshadows some of the Fourth Circuit's recent
reasoning in holding that the party bringing the challenge at the
administrative level has the burden of proof. Both courts stated that
there must be clear statutory language to the contrary in order to
depart from the general rule that a party bringing an action bears the
burden of proof.'38
Although not part of the circuit split among the courts of
appeals, the District Court of Maryland's opinion in Weast v.
129. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219-20.
130. Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 533.
131. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219.
132. L.T. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 82 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004).
133. See Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998).
134. Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 2002).
135. See E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998).
136. See Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The
school clearly had the burden of proving at the administrative hearing that it complied
with the IDEA.").
137. Id. at 1398-99.
138. See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he IDEA does not
allocate the burden of proof, and we see no reason to depart from the general rule that a
party initiating a proceeding bears that burden."), affd, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005); Clyde K., 35
F.3d at 1399 ("Allocation of the burden of proof has long been governed by the rule that
the party bringing the lawsuit must persuade the court to grant the requested relief.").
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Schaffer'39 assigning the administrative burden of proof to the school
system is significant. The Fourth Circuit's opinion reversing Weast
and the Supreme Court's opinion affirming the Fourth Circuit will be
discussed in the next two Sections, but the district court's opinion is
worth summarizing here as it presents an unusually detailed analysis
concerning the burden of proof at the administrative level. Also,
Weast presents an excellent vehicle for examining burden of proof in
IDEA due process hearings, as the administrative law judge (the
"AL") in the case changed rulings depending upon where the
burden of proof stood. 4 '
In Weast, the school system determined that Brian Schaffer, a
seventh grade student diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder, was eligible for special education services pursuant to the
IDEA.14' Brian's parents opposed the initial IEP proposed by the
school system and requested a due process hearing.4 1 In the
meantime, Brian enrolled in a private school specializing in learning-
disabled students. 43  At the due process hearing, Brian's parents
requested relief including reimbursement for the private school
placement. 4' In the initial hearing, the ALJ assigned the burden of
proof to Brian's parents. 145  Brian's parents and the school system
presented conflicting expert testimony by doctors and disability
experts. 146 The ALJ, in arriving at a decision for the school system,
stressed that in a case in which both sides present experts with
excellent credentials, positioning of the burden of proof is critical.
47
Brian's parents appealed to the District Court of Maryland,
which reallocated the burden of proof to the school system and
remanded the case to the ALJ.148  The ALJ did not consider new
evidence on remand, but only revisited the existing record. 49
Determining that the evidence "rests in equipoise" but that the school
139. 240 F. Supp. 2d 396 (D. Md. 2002), rev'd, 377 F.3d, 449 (4th Cir. 2004), affd, 126 S.
Ct. 528 (2005).
140. Id. at 399-401; see also id. at 397 n.2 (stating that the ALJ found the burden of
proof "critical" to his decision).
141. Id. at 398.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 399.
145. Id.at 398.
146. Id. at 399.
147. Id. ("Because each side's experts have diverging views on the question of what the
Child's needs were and which placement would afford the requisite educational benefit for
,he Child, an assignment of the burden of proof in this case becomes critical.").
148. Id. at 398 n.2.
149. Id. at 399.
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system now had the burden of proof, the ALl held for the parents in
finding the proposed IEP inadequate. 10 However, the ALl found
that the evidence suggested that Brian's parents had no intention of
placing Brian in the public school system and they used the
proceeding mainly as a device to receive funding for their private
school decision. 5' Accordingly, the AU limited the award to half of
the private school yearly tuition.152
The school system and Brian's parents both appealed the second
AU ruling to the District Court of Maryland; the school system
appealed the overall result and the parents appealed the damage
award. 3 The court reiterated its earlier analysis concerning the
proper placement of the burden of proof on the school system. 5 4 In
doing so, the court first distinguished the initial IEP challenge from
the established IEP challenge.'55 The court stated that when a party
seeks to change an established IEP, the burden should be on the
party seeking the change.'56 This case, however, concerned a
challenge to an initial IEP, where "the only sense in which 'change' is
involved is that the parents wish to change what the school authorities
have unilaterally proposed.' ' 57  In addition, the opinion quoted
extensively from a New Jersey case, Lascari v. Board of Education.58
Lascari equated the placement of the burden of proof with the
IDEA's procedural safeguards and reasoned that placing the burden
on the school system fit with the statutory scheme.5 9  Lascari
provided some of the foundation for the Third Circuit's Oberti
decision concerning burden of proof at the judicial level, in that
Lascari reasoned that the school system had better access to
150. Id. at 401.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 398.
154. Id. at 402-06.
155. Id. at 402. The court described a challenge to an initial IEP as involving an "IEP,
proposed by the school authorities the first time it is sought for a child, one which the
parents disagree with and as to which they seek a [sic] administrative due process
hearing." Id. In contrast, a challenge to an established IEP involves an IEP "which at one
time was agreed to by everyone, but which either the parents or the school district seeks to
change against the wishes of the other, whereupon the matter goes to a due process
hearing." Id.
156. Id. at 406.
157. Id. at 405.
158. 560 A.2d 1180 (N.J. 1989).
159. Id. at 1188 ("Like those procedural safeguards, the allocation of the burden of
proof protects the rights of handicapped children to an appropriate education.").
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educational and legal expertise and could more easily bear the
burden. 16°
B. Courts that Assigned the Burden to the Challenging Party
The courts that assigned the burden to the party challenging an
IEP relied heavily on statutory language (or the absence thereof) and
traditional statutory construction rules rather than public policy or
implied legislative intent arguments.1 61 Although these cases tend to
be especially unclear as to whether their burden of proof holdings
apply to the administrative level, they are often cited for this
proposition. 162 Most notable among these cases is the recent Fourth
Circuit decision, which made clear its holding applies to the
administrative level.1 63 In any event, their analysis lends itself just as
readily to the administrative due process hearing as to the judicial
review level.
A primary example of the reasoning utilized by the cases placing
the burden on the challenging party is Cordrey v. Euckert'" from the
Sixth Circuit. The parents in Cordrey argued that, following the
Lascari reasoning, the IDEA's extensive procedural requirements
support placing the burden of proof on the school district. 6 The
court explicitly rejected this approach, stating that "[a]bsent more
definitive authorization or compelling justification, we decline to go
beyond strict review to reverse the traditional burden of proof.'
1 66
Therefore, unlike the courts that placed the burden on the school
system, the Sixth Circuit refused to allow a policy argument to shift
the traditional placement of the burden.
The Fifth Circuit also placed the burden on the challenging
party.' The Fifth Circuit's decision in Alamo Heights Independent
School District v. State Board of Education"6 reasoned that deference
to the intricate processes that create an IEP mandate that the party
attacking its terms should bear the burden of proof.169 The Tenth
160. Id.
161. See Wenkart, supra note 115, at 817.
162. See id. at 821-22; Recent Case, Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004), 118
HARV. L. REV. 1078, 1078 n.4 (2005).
163. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449,452 (4th Cir. 2004), affd, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
164. 917 F.2d 1460 (6th Cir. 1990).
165. Id. at 1466.
166. Id.
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Circuit followed the same reasoning, placing the burden on the
challenging party.170
The Fourth Circuit in Weast took a more in-depth analysis of the
IDEA due process hearing burden of proof than any circuit court of
appeals to date when it reviewed the District Court of Maryland's
decision in Weast v. Schaffer. 7' After briefly discussing the existing
circuit split and concluding that the cases putting the burden on the
school system-including the District Court of Maryland's decision-
did not provide sufficiently persuasive analysis,'7 2 the court refuted
various arguments for placing the burden on the school system.
17 3
The court first reasoned that the school system's statutory
obligation to provide a free appropriate public education provided
insufficient justification for saddling it with the burden of proof.
17 4
The court similarly rejected the argument that because school systems
often have greater access to legal and educational expertise, they
should bear the burden of proof.7 5 The court found Congress's
creation of multiple procedural safeguards for parents as an adequate
attempt to "level the playing field."'1 76 The court reasoned that since
Congress did not explicitly place the burden on the school system as
an element of those safeguards, Congress must have meant that the
traditional rule of placing the burden on the challenging party should
apply.
177
The parents in Weast argued that since the cases that helped
inspire the IDEA, PARC78 and Mills,'79 placed the burden of proof
on the school system, Congress must have intended the same for the
IDEA.180 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument on the grounds
170. See Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The
parties should note that the burden of proof in these matters rests with the party attacking
the child's individual education plan." (citing Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d at 1153)).
171. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004), affd, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005). For
the procedural history and disposition of this case, see supra notes 139-60 and
accompanying text. For another overview of the majority and dissenting opinions in
Weast, see Recent Case, supra note 162, at 1080-82.
172. Weast, 377 F.3d at 452-53.
173. Id. at 453-56.
174. Id. at 453.
175. Id. ("We do not automatically assign the burden of proof to the side with the
bigger guns.").
176. Id.
177. Id. ("Congress has taken steps, short of allocating the burden of proof to school
systems, that level the playing field.").
178. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
180. Weast, 377 F.3d at 454-55.
1032 [Vol. 84
WHERE TO PLACE THE BURDEN
that if Congress meant to include such a shift from the traditional
rule, it would have done so explicitly.18'
Finally, the court noted that to place the burden of proof on the
school system would mean that parents could overturn an established
IEP even if no evidence were presented.182 According to the court,
this result would mean that "every challenged IEP is presumptively
inadequate.1' 83 The court reasoned that such a construction would go
against the deference to local education expertise the Supreme Court
found inherent in the IDEA in Rowley.'84
C. The Supreme Court Resolves the Circuit Split
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's Weast decision
in Schaffer v. Weast,' s' holding that the burden is on the challenging
party. 86 The majority opinion by Justice O'Connor quickly dismissed
the argument that the influence of the Mills and PARC decisions on
the IDEA drafters meant that Congress also intended to incorporate
their burden of proof scheme, stating that Congress could have done
so explicitly.'87 In addressing the argument that the burden should
fall on the school system because parents should not have to prove
facts that a school system would inherently possess, the Court cited
the IDEA's other procedural requirements such as the right to review
records and the right to an independent evaluation as evidence that
the IDEA contains other means to establish an equal evidentiary
playing field.'88 The Court concluded that the burden should lie "as it
typically does, on the party seeking relief."' 89
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, arguing that practical
advantages school systems have with regard to access to information
and educational expertise counsel for placing the burden on them.1 90
Justice Ginsburg cited the Oberti and Lascari decisions in support of
her argument that policy considerations point toward a departure
from the traditional placement of the burden.19' Justice Ginsburg
181. Id. at 455 ("For the Act here, it borrowed some ideas and specifically ignored
others. We cannot conclude from this that Congress intended to adopt the ideas that it
failed to write into the text of the statute.").
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 455-56.
185. 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
186. Id. at 531.
187. Id. at 535.
188. Id. at 536.
189. Id. at 531.
190. Id. at 538-39 (Ginsburg. J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 538.
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concluded that a school system in a due process hearing should be
required "to explain persuasively why its proposed IEP satisfies
IDEA's standards."' 92
IV. THE APPROPRIATE POSITIONING OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
As evidenced by the number of conflicting appellate opinions,193
there are a variety of arguments to be made regarding the
appropriate place for the burden of proof in IDEA administrative
due process hearings. When viewed as a whole, commentators frame
these arguments around a certain set of issues, with the debate over
exactly which way each issue cuts. Analysis of each issue in detail
should focus on practical application when appropriate. The
discussion in this Part concerns an ongoing challenge to a complete,
implemented IEP. The issue of a dispute arising with an initial IEP,
not yet agreed to by the parents, and how this should be handled
differently is discussed in Part V.
As a prerequisite to this debate, it must first be reinforced that
the statute does not discuss the burden of proof. Therefore, a
statutory construction canon such as the plain meaning rule' 94 cannot
resolve the issue. The case for placing the burden on the parents rests
primarily on the rule that the burden of proof normally goes to the
party seeking relief.9 ' There can be variations on this rule however,
since as the Fourth Circuit noted "other factors such as policy
considerations, convenience, and fairness may allow for a different
allocation of the burden of proof.'19 6 The discussion that follows
analyzes "other factors" such as the IDEA's precursors and history,
the comparison of the IDEA to other federal remedial statutes, the
IDEA's procedural safeguards, and the recent 2004 IDEA
Reauthorization to determine whether there should be an exception
to the traditional burden of proof placement.
192. Id. at 540.
193. See supra Part III.
194. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("Where the language is
plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise,
and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.").
195. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 2004), affd, 126 S.Ct. 528 (2005)
("When a statute is silent, the burden of proof is normally allocated to the party initiating
the proceeding and seeking relief." (citation omitted)).
196. Id. (citation omitted).
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A. IDEA Precursors, IDEA Reauthorization, and Burden of Proof
This Section considers whether congressional concern for the
rights of disabled children, evident in the statute's precursors and
legislative history, translates into intent to place the burden of proof
on the school system. As noted above in the discussions of the Fourth
Circuit's Weast decision,'97 the Supreme Court's Schaffer decision,'98
and the IDEA's history, 9 9 Congress was especially motivated by
PARC and Mills to pass the statute that would become the IDEA.
The statute, therefore, borrows a number of procedural safeguards
suggested in these cases."° While Mills affirmatively placed the
burden of proof on the school system,2"' the result in PARC was not
so clear. The PARC court placed the initial burden of production
2°
on the school system to present the required report recommending a
change in educational status, but then the court shifted the burden of
production to the parents to introduce evidence supporting their
contention regarding such change.203  The parents could call any
school official with evidence on the proposed action as a witness as
well as present expert testimony of their own.2° The required report
mentioned by the Pennsylvania court bears great similarity to the
notice requirements under the IDEA,05 so in that sense, school
197. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
200. For example, the parents and school system in PARC agreed to a stipulation that
included the following provisions, among others: notice to the parents of a proposed
change in educational status, the due process hearing itself, the right of access for the
parents to the school system's records, and the right of the parents to present evidence.
Penn. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennslyvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 303-05 (E.D. Pa.
1972). The order in Mills included the following provisions: notice, hearing, the right to
records, and the right to present evidence. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 880-82
(D.D.C. 1972).
201. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 882 ("[The school system] shall bear the burden of proof
as to all facts and as to the appropriateness of any disposition and of the alternative
educational opportunity to be provided during any suspension.").
202. The burden of production refers to which party must come forward with evidence,
which is a different concept than the burden of persuasion. See supra note 12.
203. See PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 305 ("Introduction by the school district or
intermediate unit of the official report recommending a change ... shall discharge its
burden of going forward with the evidence, thereby requiring the parent to introduce
evidence.., in support of his contention.").
204. Id.
205. Compare PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 304 ("The notice shall describe the proposed
action in detail, including specification of the statute or regulation under which such action
is proposed and a clear and full statement of the reasons therefor, including specification
of any tests or reports upon which such action is proposed."), with 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1415(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2005) (requiring in the due process notice "an explanation of
why the agency proposes or refuses to take the action and a description of each evaluation
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districts do have an initial burden of production, even under the
Supreme Court's recent decision. Indeed, to the extent that the
modern IEP is a much more thorough document than the report
required by the court in PARC,206 the IDEA requires the school
system to meet a burden exceeding that mandated by PARC before a
party may bring a due process challenge.
Thus, the evidence from the decisions foreshadowing the IDEA
is mixed. However, when Congress reauthorized the IDEA in
December 2004, months after the Fourth Circuit's decision and years
after the other major decisions in the circuit split, it did modify the
due process section of the statute,2 17 but did not touch the burden of
proof. Legislative silence does not necessarily mean acceptance of a
judicial interpretation of a statute,208 but a valid argument exists in
this instance in particular that Congress had an opportunity to
conclusively rectify this circuit split and did not take it. A large
number of interest groups have a stake in the IDEA, and between the
special education lobby29 and the school administrators lobby,
210
plenty of evidence exists that Congress recognized this issue when
reformulating the IDEA. The parent-oriented IDEA reauthorization
lobbying efforts primarily concerned themselves with disciplinary
procedure, assessment, record, or report the agency used as a basis for the proposed or
refused action").
206. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text; see also IEP GUIDE, supra note 65
(sample IEP form).
207. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
208. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 187 (1994) (stating that generally, arguments based on congressional inaction
"deserve little weight in the interpretative process"); see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that it is "impossible to assert with
any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents (1) approval of the
status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3)
unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political
cowardice").
209. See, e.g., League of Special Education Voters, http://www.spedvoters2.org (last
visited Feb. 22, 2006) (detailing the views of parent-oriented lobbying group organized to
influence the IDEA); National Center for Learning Disabilities, http://www.ld.org/
advocacy/IDEAwatch.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006) (listing parent-oriented advocacy
IDEA advocacy links); Position Paper on the Reauthorization of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (2004), http://p078.ezboard.com/fourchildrenleft
behindfrm28.showMessage?topiclD=95.topic [hereinafter Position Paper] (protesting
certain provisions of the 2004 IDEA reauthorization, listing 195 ratifying organizations).
210. See, e.g., AASA Letters of Support Urging Final Passage of IDEA
Reauthorization: House Letter (2004), http://www.aasa.org/policy/content.cfm?Item
Number=2004&snltemNumber=1984 [hereinafter AASA Letters] (listing eight changes in
the IDEA reauthorization of which school administrators particularly approve); American
Association of School Administrators, http://www.aasa.org (last visited Feb. 22, 2006)
(organization representing public school administrators).
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proceedings, IEP content requirements, and the new attorney's fees
provisions.21 In addition, the school district-oriented IDEA lobbying
efforts appear similarly unconcerned with the burden of proof.2 12 As
the Fourth Circuit in Weast noted, "If experience shows that parents
do not have sufficient access to substantive expertise under the
current statutory scheme, Congress should be called upon to take
further remedial steps. "213 Congress had ample opportunity and
incentive to take such further remedial steps in the months directly
following the Weast decision and chose not to act on this subject.
Unlike most of the decisions in the circuit split, Weast dealt
exclusively with the burden of proof. The immediacy and directness
of the Weast decision, so close to the enactment of the 2004
reauthorization, suggests congressional acceptance of its result.
However, the fact that more circuits continued to place the burden on
the school system indicates otherwise. Since it is difficult to draw a
conclusion concerning congressional intent on the burden of proof
from the passage of the 2004 statute, we must look to other sources
for principles to guide us toward the correct positioning of the
burden.
B. IDEA and the Comparison to Other Remedial Statutes
The majority and dissenting opinions from the Fourth Circuit's
Weast decision as well as academic commentary all debate the merits
of comparing the IDEA to other federal remedial statutes, such as the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which have more settled burden of proof
schemes.1 4 For example, the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting scheme operates as follows: the plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination.215 If the plaintiff can do so,
211. See Position Paper, supra note 209.
212. See AASA Letters, supra note 210. After noting that, "[t]he reauthorization also
missed opportunities to clarify certain issues," the letter goes on to discuss Medicaid
reimbursement. Id. The only part of the letter directly concerned with due process states
that the reauthorization makes gains toward "[mlaking the complaint process much
clearer for parents and school officials." Id.
213. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 2004), affd, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
214. For the Weast majority view on this point, see Weast, 377 F.3d at 453. For the
dissent, see Weast, 377 F.3d at 457-58 (Luttig, J., dissenting). See also Anne E. Johnson,
Note, Evening the Playing Field: Tailoring the Allocation of the Burden of Proof at IDEA
Due Process Hearings To Balance Children's Rights and Schools' Needs, 46 B.C. L. REV.
591, 610-11 (2005); Recent Case, supra note 162, at 1082-84.
215. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (stating that a
prima facie case requires showing membership in a racial minority, qualification for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants, rejection despite qualification, and the
employer's continued seeking of applicants with the plaintiff's qualifications).
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the burden then shifts to the employer to put forth a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its alleged discriminatory action. 16
Finally, the plaintiff must show that the proffered legitimate reason is
a pretext for discrimination.217 The Weast majority stated that this
comparison warrants a conclusion that the challenging party should
have the burden of proof in remedial statutes.218 In contrast, the
dissent argued that there is a crucial difference between the IDEA
and other remedial statutes in that the IDEA provides for an
"affirmative obligation" on school systems and not simply a
remedy.219
In essence, both of these positions are correct. Judge Luttig's
dissent is correct that the IDEA imposes a greater affirmative,
prophylactic obligation on IDEA defendants (school systems) than
Title VII does on discrimination defendants (employers, for
example). This obligation's consequence, however, should not be the
shifting of the burden of proof to the schools but rather the IEP
product itself. As the parent-oriented lobbying efforts stated, the IEP
is the major practical focus of the IDEA.22° The IEP is the subject of
some very specific statutory language221 requiring school districts to
expend significant resources accommodating the needs of disabled
students.22 The correct analogy to McDonnell Douglas is that the
preliminary cost incurred under the IDEA by the school systems in
effect fulfills the second part of the burden-shifting framework: the
defendant's required legitimate reason. This leaves the plaintiffs
(parents) with the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case and
rebuttal burden of proving that the defendant's proffered legitimate
reason (IEP) is inadequate. If Congress wished to make Title VII
resemble the modern IDEA, it would have to describe detailed
procedures for how employers must work with individual employees
216. Id.
217. See id. at 802-04.
218. See Weast, 377 F.3d at 453 ("Like the IDEA, these statutes are silent about burden
of proof, yet we assign it to the plaintiff who seeks the statutory protection or benefit
219. See id. at 457-58 (Luttig, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the civil rights statutes
referenced by the majority, the IDEA does not merely seek to remedy discrimination
against disabled students, it imposes an affirmative obligation on the nation's school
systems to provide disabled students with an enhanced level of attention and services.").
220. See Position Paper, supra note 209 ("[T]here is no justification ... to weaken the
Individualized Education Program (IEP), a parent's strongest tool for holding schools
accountable for their child's learning to high standards.").
221. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d) (West Supp. 2005).
222. For example, if a parent disagrees with a disability evaluation performed by the
school system, the parent has a right to an independent evaluation paid for by the school
system. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1) (2004).
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to create plans assuring them of nondiscriminatory treatment and the
procedures employers must follow when deviating from these plans.
Instead, the current Title VII system allows employers to argue this
assurance as the middle step of a burden-shifting scheme in litigation.
In contrast, the IDEA places the burden on school systems to create
the assurance before a dispute arises.
There is a more attractive comparison between the IDEA and
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), but it does not justify
placing the burden of proof on school systems.223 The ADA places an
obligation on employers to take "affirmative steps ... to
accommodate the disabled." '224  This active accommodation
requirement makes the ADA more similar to the IDEA than Title
VII. The burden-shifting scheme under the ADA's reasonable
accommodations provision requires first that the plaintiff make a
prima facie case that he has a qualifying disability and was terminated
for that reason.2 5 The employer then has the burden of presenting
evidence explaining the inability to accommodate the disability, and
finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut this evidence.226
Courts make clear, however, that with the ADA as in Title VII, "[t]he
plaintiff at all times bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that he has been the victim of illegal discrimination based on
his disability. '227 The ADA also lacks a parallel to the IDEA's IEP,
in that it does not require the pre-litigation preparation of a thorough
document detailing the ways the parties will behave. The logic of an
ADA burden-shifting scheme is attractive, and it is in fact consistent
with that logic to put the burden on the parents as opposed to the
school system in IDEA administrative due process hearings.
C. The IDEA's Procedural Safeguards and the Burden of Proof
The IDEA provides extensive procedural safeguards for
parents.22s Both sides of the debate recognize these safeguards, and
both sides recognize that school systems have a natural advantage in
IDEA due process hearings because of easier access to witnesses,
223. Contra Recent Case, supra note 162, at 1082-85 (arguing that the ADA
comparison is appropriate and suggesting a shift of the burden of proof to the school
district once the parents have made a prima facie case).
224. Id. at 1083.
225. See White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1995).
226. See id. Note the similarity to the McDonnell Douglas scheme above. See id. at
361 n.6 ("We developed an analysis ... much like the McDonnell Douglas test applicable
in Title VII discrimination cases .... "(citation omitted)).
227. Id. at 361 (citations omitted).
228. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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expertise, and resources.229 The question then becomes whether the
IDEA's procedural safeguards adequately "level the playing field" so
as to lend support to the argument that the burden of proof should be
on the challenger,23° or whether the safeguards simply show
Congress's awareness of the school systems' advantage. Under that
theory, placing the burden on the school systems furthers the goal of
providing needed help to parents.231
Regardless of how one analyzes the effectiveness of the IDEA
safeguards, Congress did consider the natural advantages of school
systems by enacting the safeguards, and has very recently reaffirmed
their importance in the 2004 Reauthorization.232 The Supreme Court
noted in Rowley that the IDEA contains "elaborate and highly
specific procedural safeguards. 2 33 Keeping in mind the cautions that
should accompany interpreting legislative silence,2 34 if Congress had
wanted to add the safeguard of always placing the burden of proof on
the school system in the due process hearing it would have done so.
Some may argue, however, that even if Congress enacted the
procedural safeguards as an attempt to "level the playing field," they
do not go far enough, necessitating a shift in the burden of proof.
235
To the contrary, the IDEA's procedural safeguards provide extensive
protection so that such a shift is not required. 236  First, the notice
required by the statute to be given to parents has a large number of
statutory237 and regulatory238 content requirements. Second, the
statute requires the person conducting the hearing be impartial (i.e.,
229. See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2004), affd, 126 S. Ct. 528
(2005).
230. See Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 536-37 (2005) (noting the procedural
safeguards the IDEA grants parents and stating that the "protections ensure that the
school bears no unique informational advantage"); see also Weast, 377 F.3d at 456
("[Congress] was keenly aware that school systems have professional expertise and that
parents do not. It was for this very reason that Congress imposed statutory safeguards to
assist parents in becoming substantively informed.").
231. Weast, 377 F.3d at 458 (Luttig, J., dissenting) ("[EJven in the rosiest of scenarios,
the provision of such remedial protections and services would not begin to impart to the
average parent the level of expertise or knowledge that the school district possesses as a
matter of course.").
232. See H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 112 (2003) ("The procedural safeguards in the Act
have historically provided the foundation for ensuring access to a free appropriate public
education for children with disabilities.").
233. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982) (noting that "the importance
Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid").
234. See supra note 208.
235. See Recent Case, supra note 162, at 1085.
236. See OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 42, at 167.
237. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(c)(1) (West Supp. 2005).
238. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.504 (2004).
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not an employee of a state educational agency or having a personal
conflict of interest) and qualified (i.e., understands the statute and is
able to conduct a legal hearing).239  Third, the statute gives the
complaining party the right to be accompanied by counsel.240 Fourth,
the statute grants "the right to present evidence and confront, cross-
examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses. ' 24' Finally, the
statute requires the school system to allow the parents to examine all
records related to the child.242 These rights are an excellent balance
against the school system's superior position, as they assure the
parents access to all the information the school system has on the
child 243  as well as a trial-like process in front of a neutral
administrative judge. While critics may argue that "the limited
discovery available in many IDEA due process hearings '244 stems
from difficulty parents may have in securing the appearance of
witnesses, this argument is without merit as a matter of statutory
construction. Any such difficulty would spring from a state's lack of
compliance with regulations and not from the statutory scheme
itself.
245
Furthermore, the IDEA's procedural protections are crucial in
understanding the IDEA's proper place as a remedial statute. As
discussed above, the IDEA is most fairly compared with other federal
statutes, such as the ADA, when the school system is seen as
preemptively fulfilling the defendant's position in the burden-shifting
scheme during the IEP creation process.246 Therefore, in expending
the time and resources necessary to create a procedurally adequate
IEP, the school system discharges its burden of producing a legitimate
239. U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)(3)(A).
240. Id. § 1415(h)(1).
241. Id. § 1415(h)(2).
242. Id. § 1415(b)(1).
243. See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 127, at 165 ("IDEA's extensive procedural
protections, including the right to have access to records, however, provide considerable
means for the parents to acquire information.").
244. Recent Case, supra note 162, at 1085 (citing Sharon C. Streett, The Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 35, 41 (1996)).
245. See Streett, supra note 244, at 41 n.57 (stating that the IDEA and regulations state
that both parties have the right to compel witnesses to attend due process hearings, but
that Arkansas is not in compliance); see also Goldberg & Kuriloff, supra note 10, at 493
(noting that the IDEA due process hearing meets all of Judge Friendly's ten elements for
a fair hearing) (citing Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1279-93 (1975)). The argument that formal due process hearings are not appropriate in an
education context at all, see supra note 84 and accompanying text, is separate from the
point here, namely that to the extent we currently have a due process hearing model, the
IDEA's provisions are very fair to the parents.
246. See supra Part IV.B.
2006] 1041
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
rationale for its actions. 247 The IDEA's procedural safeguards play a
crucial role in legitimizing the school system's efforts in this regard,
ensuring that the school system will put in the necessary work toward
fulfilling its substantive obligations.248 Therefore, it is appropriate to
put the administrative burden of proof on parents challenging the
byproduct of this effort. In his book on IEP team meetings, James
Hollis argues that complaints and due process hearings related to
IEPs are so prevalent, IEP team meetings should be structured in
anticipation of them.249 With so much of the IDEA focused on
procedure, it seems only fair that the party attacking the product of
the procedure should bear the burden of proof in a due process
hearing.
Some argue that the burden of proof should be split, whereby the
school system would bear the burden on procedural issues and the
challenging party would bear the burden on substantive issues.2
This argument is especially attractive when considering the
importance of the IDEA's procedural protections in legitimizing the
IEP. However, it faces several practical hurdles. First, the act of
dividing substance and procedure is a notoriously difficult task.251
Introducing this division in IDEA due process hearings would add a
layer of complexity to an already intricate proceeding, to the
advantage of neither the child nor the parents. Assuming, however,
that this division is clear, putting the procedural burden on the school
system is not the kind of help parents truly require. Courts and
commentators usually refer to the uneven playing field between
parents and schools in substantive terms.252 School systems do not
247. In response to the argument that the burden should be on the school system, the
Supreme Court has implicitly recognized the deference a court should accord an
established IEP. See Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 536 (2005) ("Petitioners in effect
ask this Court to assume that every IEP is invalid until the school district demonstrates
that it is not. The Act does not support this conclusion.").
248. See HOLLIS, supra note 49, at 3 ("[I]f the IEP team uses correct procedures, then
more often than not the IEP team will make the best decision in the interests of the
child.").
249. Id. ("[I]n today's litigious world of special education, teachers, administrators,
assessment personnel, and parents could benefit from approaching IEP team meetings...
with one eye focused on making a record for appeal, in order to get the most from IDEA's
procedural safeguards.").
250. See Johnson, supra note 214, at 612-23.
251. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 193 (2004)
(stating that, in the context of federal law, "[m]ore than sixty years of Erie jurisprudence
has yet to result in any clear consensus on the distinction between substance and
procedure").
252. See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe school district will have better information about the resources available to it, as
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have a similar advantage concerning potentially contested procedural
matters, such as notice content and timelines, IEP team meeting
participation, the opportunity for a resolution session, and related
procedural issues. In the burden-splitting proposal, school systems
would have the burden on such issues, which the parents could
contest relatively easily, while the parents would still have the burden
on issues where the school system has a substantive advantage in
educational expertise. Finally, although such a proposal might help
ensure school systems follow the IDEA procedures to the letter, one
must consider whether the potential gain is worth the cost to the
school system, especially given the questionable practical effect of the
burden splitting in terms of help for parents. 3 School systems bear a
large procedural burden in creating an IEP, and the party attacking
its terms should be prepared to overcome a presumption of validity
that these procedures bestow.
D. The Impact of the 2004 IDEA Reauthorization on the Burden of
Proof
The 2004 IDEA Reauthorization made several changes to the
existing IDEA but focused on bringing more possibilities for
alternative dispute resolution to special education law. 254 The new
statute requires states to develop procedures to allow for mediation
of disputes at any time, even before the filing of a complaint. 5 The
statute also requires a resolution session between parents, the school
system, and relevant IEP team members with the possibility of a
binding settlement if the parties reach an agreement.256 Now, even
before the formal hearing process begins, parents have avenues open
to them to communicate with their school district and achieve a
mutually favorable result. To the extent that the argument for
placing the burden on the school district is based on the perception of
an uneven playing field created by the technical, legalistic hearing
well as the benefit of its experience with other disabled children."), affd, 126 S. Ct. 528
(2005); Lascari v. Bd. of Educ., 560 A.2d 1180, 1188 (N.J. 1989) (arguing that since the
school system has greater access to the information, it should bear the burden of proof);
Recent Case, supra note 162, at 1085 (citing "institutional knowledge and resources" as
reasons for shifting the burden to school districts).
253. See Johnson, supra note 214, at 621 ("[Slchool districts already have a strong
financial incentive to meet their statutory obligations, both procedural and substantive.").
254. See H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 85-86 (2003) ("The bill encourages the use of
mediation and voluntary binding arbitration to speed the resolution time so that children
with disabilities obtain the needed services and education in a timely manner.").
255. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(1) (West Supp. 2005).
256. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B).
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process,257 these changes undercut that argument by providing parents
with multiple informal dispute resolution possibilities before any
formal hearing. The changes, therefore, provide further support for
the argument that when an IEP is challenged, the burden should be
on the attacking party.
There is significant debate about the appropriateness of
mediation in the IDEA context. 58  Supporters and critics agree,
however, that mediation, at least in certain situations, can lead to
positive outcomes that circumvent the delay, expense, and adversarial
nature of a due process proceeding. 9 It remains to be seen how the
new dispute resolution section in the IDEA Reauthorization will
impact the process, as it only became effective in July 2005.260 At a
minimum, the new procedure provides a forum for parents to
advocate for their child without attorneys present, as the statute only
allows the school system to have an attorney if the parents are
accompanied by one as well. 6' Since one of the main critiques of the
IDEA mediation procedure is a perceived power imbalance between
parents and school systems,262 this provision helps level the field.
However, the crucial component of effective alternate dispute
resolution in special education-the ability of the parents' advocacy-
would seem to be even more pivotal in a resolution session where
there are no formal hearing rules concerning witnesses, evidence, or
other trial-like matters.263
257. See Johnson, supra note 214, at 602; see also supra notes 159-60 and
accompanying text.
258. See generally Steven Marchese, Putting Square Pegs into Round Holes: Mediation
and the Rights of Children with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 333
(2001) (analyzing mediation in special education and concluding that "parents and school
districts must carefully evaluate whether mediation is appropriate in a given context").
259. See HOLLIS, supra note 49, at 3-4 ("Those who have litigated special education
due process hearings, prepared for hearing, or struggled through hearing as a witness
know this: mediation or settlement, based on a mutually agreed-upon resolution, usually
produces a more satisfactory outcome for the child than going to trial."); Marchese, supra
note 258, at 365 ("[I]f a school district sincerely values parental input, mediation may be
an additional opportunity for the district to explain its position and obtain a compromise
that benefits all parties.").
260. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-446, § 302(a)(1), 118 Stat. 2647, 2803.
261. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(III).
262. See Marchese, supra note 258, at 362 ("Particularly where parents lack the ability
to advocate effectively on their own behalf, the presence of an outside advocate, in
particular, a lawyer, could potentially mitigate any possible power imbalances.").
263. Id. at 365 (noting that mediation is most attractive, "where a parent is capable of
advocating effectively on behalf of her child, understands the issues involved, and has a
realistic sense of what the best possible resolution could be in litigation").
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Regardless of whether these alternate procedures are effective
on their own in producing satisfactory outcomes, their presence lends
support to a presumption of the IEP's validity, as well as to the
argument for placing the burden of proof on the challenging party.
With more procedures now available for parents to challenge an IEP
before a due process hearing begins, an IEP should be entitled to an
even greater presumption of validity when such a hearing
commences.2" Now, both unsuccessful mediation and an informal
resolution session concerning the IEP may precede a formal hearing.
It thus seems counterintuitive to have an IEP emerge unscathed
through two processes and then be treated as presumptively invalid in
a due process hearing by placing the burden on the school district to
rebut an attack against it. The effectiveness of these procedures in
any particular case will depend on the circumstances of that case, but
Congress attempted to provide parents with several opportunities to
discuss an IEP on neutral terms with the school system. Thus, when
an IEP survives these preliminary challenges and the burdensome full
due process hearing is about to begin, the IEP deserves a
presumption of validity that the attacking party must overcome.
V. THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND AN INITIAL IEP
The above discussion concludes that the burden of proof in an
IDEA due process hearing involving a complete, established IEP
should be placed on the challenging parents. The analysis changes
when the IEP rests in the proposal stage with its provisions lacking
parental approval. In that case, the factors discussed above are either
not relevant or point toward placing the burden on the school system.
First, as noted above, the legislative history of the IDEA does
not forcefully speak to putting the burden on one particular party,
and Congress chose not to address the issue in the 2004
Reauthorization.265 This is just as unhelpful in the situation with a
challenge to an initial IEP as with a challenge to an established one.
However, the logical comparison of the IDEA to other federal
remedial statutes is more informative. The IDEA is best viewed as
similar to other remedial federal statutes, such as Title VII or the
ADA, as utilizing the standard McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework, but with the school system having carried its burden with
the creation of the IEP itself.266 Prior to the complete implementation
264. See supra note 248.
265. See supra Part IV.A.
266. See supra Part IV.B.
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of an IEP, the school system retains the initial duties that are central
to the operation of the IDEA. The IDEA requires informed consent
from parents before school systems can begin providing special
education services to their children.2 67 Before this consent, the IEP
cannot be implemented and the school system's duty to work with the
parents remains. In such a situation, the school system's burden is
unmet, and the framework suggested by statutes such as the ADA
should control where the parents make an initial showing that their
child is disabled (i.e., qualified under the IDEA). The burden then
shifts to the school system to justify its proposed IEP.268
Shifting the burden to the school system when parents challenge
an initial IEP also ensures the proper role of the IDEA's procedural
safeguards. As noted above, the IDEA's extensive safeguards and
procedures aim to ensure a correct substantive educational
outcome.269 By definition, these safeguards have not yet produced a
satisfactory outcome in the case of an initial IEP. Parental consent to
an IEP means that the parties agreed at one time that the school
system discharged its duty in following its procedures to create, in
partnership with the parents, a plan for the education of the disabled
child. Lacking this initial consent, the school system should not be
entitled to the assumption that it followed adequate procedures and
discharged this duty. The very fact that parents challenge an initial
IEP evinces a problem somewhere in the attempt to create the IEP.
In contrast, implicit in an established IEP is that the IDEA's
procedures worked to produce a plan that both the school system and
the parents agreed upon. In essence, a school system can point
toward an established IEP and say, "We worked with the parents and
followed the rules, the rules are the heart of the statute,270 therefore
we must be accorded deference." The school system cannot make
this assertion when the parents did not consent to anything.
Therefore, the deference owed to the procedures when parents
challenge an established IEP should be minimal when the dispute
surrounds an initial, unapproved IEP.
The new dispute resolution procedures in the 2004
Reauthorization also favor shifting the burden of proof to the school
system when an initial IEP is challenged. The availability of these
new procedures aids in ensuring that an established IEP is worthy of
267. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (ii)(II) (West Supp. 2005).
268. For a description of how such a scheme could work, see Recent Case, supra note
162, at 1084.
269. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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deference, but when an IEP is yet to be agreed upon by the parents,
this is not a relevant consideration. The legislative history of the 2004
Reauthorization makes clear that the new procedural devices are not
meant to supplant traditional due process hearings in any way.271
When a parent disagrees with the local school system about the
direction of an initial IEP, the revised statute, while giving more
options for dispute resolution, does not diminish the possibility of a
due process challenge or make it appropriate for the burden to be on
the parents.
While the reasoning and logic pertaining to a due process
challenge of an established IEP point toward placing the burden on
the challenging parents, the same reasoning and logic point in the
opposite direction when an initial IEP is challenged. This is the
direction the district court took in the Weast case.272 In contrast, the
Supreme Court's holding placing the burden on the parents does not
distinguish between challenging an initial or established IEP.273
Placing the burden on the school system after the parents make a
prima facie showing of their child's qualifying disability is the correct
outcome for a challenge to an initial IEP. Otherwise, the burden is
on the parents to prevent a school system's unilateral imposition of its
concept of special education services. Such an outcome conflicts with
the basic premise that the IDEA should encourage heavy
collaboration between parents and school systems to determine what
is best for educating disabled children.
CONCLUSION
The IDEA mandates a "free appropriate public education" for
all children with disabilities.274  The statute involves extensive
procedures, both in the formation of an IEP and in providing parents
of disabled children ways to advocate on their behalf. The
administrative due process hearing is the last resort for parents
challenging an IEP. The statute is silent on the burden of proof in
such a hearing, and a circuit split developed regarding its proper
placement. The comparison with other federal remedial statutes, the
271. See H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 113 (2003) ("[A] choice to mediate does not
foreclose any procedural avenues . ); id. at 114 ("Importantly, this [voluntary binding
arbitration] system is truly voluntary for both the parent and the local education agency to
choose .... The resolution session is not intended to delay the ability of a parent to access
a due process hearing.").
272. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
273. See Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 537 (2005).
274. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2005).
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IDEA's procedural safeguards, and the recent 2004 amendments to
the statute all point toward placing the burden on parents challenging
an IEP, at least when the IEP has previously been established and put
into operation. When an initial IEP is being challenged, these same
factors lead to the conclusion that after an initial qualification
showing by the parents, the burden should be on the school system.
Congress can facilitate this with an amendment to the IDEA, but this
is unlikely to occur in the near future since Congress has only very
recently amended and reauthorized the statute. The Supreme Court's
decision in Schaffer v. Weast may provide impetus for Congress to act,
but until it does, the burden of proof in administrative due process
hearings will be governed by the Court's most important special
education case since Rowley.
WILLIAM D. WHITE
